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Abstract: This article analyzes persistence and the drivers of profitability in US and EU food processing 
using GMM estimations. Due to different firm size structures first comparable samples of US and EU 
food processors are derived using Propensity Score Matching. The GMM results indicate that profit 
persistence in food processing is lower than in other manufacturing sectors. Firm-specific drivers of 
profitability are size, growth and financial risk. Regarding industry characteristics the growth rate 
significantly influences profitability. The findings provide insights for the management of food 
processing firms as well as for policy decisions aiming to counter power imbalances in the food sector.  
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The present project analyses what drives profitability in the food sector and compares the results with 
the manufacturing industry in general but also between the European Union and the United States. 
One of the main findings is that competition is stronger and profitability is lower within the food sector 
as compared with the manufacturing sector in general.  This is mainly attributable to a high market 
saturation and to the fierce competition between the big retail companies. While the competition profits 
the consumer, it puts strong bargaining pressure on the producers. Therefore, one of the main drivers 
of profitability and profit persistence within the food sector is firm size. Larger producers seem to be in 
a better bargaining position against the retail sector and this seems to be both the case in the EU and in 
the US.  
$GHWHUPLQDQWZKHUHWKHIRRGVHFWRUVHHPVWRGLIIHUEHWZHHQWKHWZRUHJLRQVLVILUP¶VJURZWK:KLOH
WKHLPSDFWRIILUP¶VJURZWKRQSURILWDELOLW\LVSRVLWLYHLQWKH86LWLVLQVLJQLILFDQWLQWKH(8This may 
be because while growing firms have to take into consideration higher costs and this may decrease 
profitability.  
And this may explain yet another difference between the determinants of profitability in the food sector 
in the US and in the EU. While the impact of (long-term) debt is positive in the US, it is negative in the 
EU. By having easier access to debt, US firms are presumably able to better counteract this potentially 
negative effect of growth. Long-term debt can enable firms to make the necessary investments that help 
to ensure competitiveness in times of crisis. In the EU firms indebted in the long run seem to find it 
more difficult to cope with risk. 
The results have not only purely descriptive value but can also be useful when designing policies aimed 
at supporting food sector firms or the food sector as a whole. This is important as today firms are facing 
economic circumstances characterized by reduced entry barriers and possibilities to operate in 
previously hardly accessible foreign markets. Those developments are a consequence of intensified 
globalization represented by trade agreements such as the NAFTA or the formation of a single market 
for goods and services within the EU. However, these deregulations of borders and international trade 
have led to a significant intensification of competition among firms across many sectors. Pressure on 
the margins and competitiveness of food processors is further intensified by increasing uncertainty in 
raw material markets and strong concentration in retail sectors. A high and constantly growing share of 
private labels further increases power imbalances between processors and retailers. In the EU the food 
VHFWRUKDVDOUHDG\GUDZQDWWHQWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHVZLWKDIRFXVRIUHWDLOHU¶VEX\HUSRZHUYLV-
à-vis the producers. The present results confirm the need for policy interventions at the downstream 
level. Moreover, the positive impact of firm size and growth on profitability indicates that small firms 
and firms with low growth are in a disadvantageous position. Thus, policy measures which address the 
industry could focus on a decrease of administrative burdens particularly for the large number of small 
enterprises. Furthermore, policy actions that decrease unfavourable financial risk factors -particularly 
short term risk in the US and long term risk in the EU- might strengthen processors and help to counter 
power imbalances. Finally, the US results indicate that in times of economic crisis measures that 




The analysis of firm profits that diverge from the competitive profit rate is one of the pivotal 
fields of study within economic research (e.g. Porter 1980; Barney 1991; McGahan and Porter 
2003; Hirsch and Gschwandtner 2013).  
From a theoretical point of view the neoclassical model of perfect competition postulates 
that firm profits above or below the competitive norm cannot persist in the long run as such 
µDEQRUPDO¶SURILWVDUHLPPHGLDWHO\GULYHQEDFNWRWKHQRUPE\competitive forces (e.g. Carlton 
and Perloff 2005). Nevertheless, in the real world, profits that diverge from the competitive 
norm are, despite declining trade barriers, a rather usual phenomenon for many industrial 
markets.  
 Starting with the contributions of Mueller (1986, 1990) many empirical studies have shown 
that industries are in general characterized by a large number of firms generating profits that 
diverge from the competitive norm in the long run -a phenomenon usually referred to as profit 
persistence. The majority of those studies either considers entire economies or is restricted to 
firms operating in manufacturing sectors of specific countries. Some important studies on profit 
persistence include: Waring (1996), Wiggins and Ruefli (2002), Chacar and Vissa (2005), and 
Gschwandtner (2005), for the US manufacturing sector; Glen et al. (2001) for 7 developing 
countries; Goddard et al., (2005), Bou and Satorra (2007), Pattitoni et al. (2014), and Gallizo 
et al. (2014) for the EU manufacturing and service sector.  
While most previous studies on food industry performance, focus on more specific aspects 
such as the impact of retailer concentration on industry innovation (Weiss and Wittkopp 2005) 
or the influence of diversification strategies on profit (Dorsey and Boland 2009) as yet, only a 
few studies have explicitly analyzed the persistence and drivers of µabnormal¶ profits in the 
food sector. For the US food economy Schumacher and Boland (2005) using variance 
decomposition methods find that industry effects are more important for profit persistence than 
corporate effects. Nevertheless, Schumacher and Boland do not quantify the firm and industry 
characteristics (such as firm size or industry concentration) which determine the extent of 
µabnormal¶ profits. Chaddad and Mondelli (2013) apply hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to 
the US food economy to determine the impact of industry and firm effects as well as those 
structural factors that affect the performance of firms in this sector. They find that firm effects 
outweigh industry effects and that structural firm- and industry variables such as corporate 
R&D intensity and industry capital intensity are significant drivers of firm profits. In a similar 
study Hirsch et al. (2014) apply HLM to the EU food processing industry. Their results also 
provide evidence for dominant firm effects. Furthermore, firm size and industry concentration 
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are identified as the main drivers of performance. However, the HLM approach is of static 
nature and not suitable to capture the dynamics of firm profits over time. Nevertheless, it can 
be assumed that the conditional probability that a firm will achieve a specific degree of 
µabnormal¶ profits in the future is a dynamic function of µabnormal¶ profits in the past (e.g. 
Hsiao 2007; Baltagi 2008). Due to this reason Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) implement a 
dynamic panel model to a large panel of EU food processors. They show that due to high market 
saturation and strong bargaining pressure from the retail sector the persistence of µabnormal¶ 
firm profits in the EU food industry is significantly lower compared to other manufacturing 
sectors. As the main profit driver they identify firm size as besides economies of scale larger 
firms are in a better bargaining position against the retail sector.  
In summary as yet no study exists that estimates the degree of profit persistence as well as 
the structural drivers of µabnormal¶ firm profits in the US food sector using a dynamic approach. 
Our primary objective is therefore to provide evidence on the drivers and persistence of 
µabnormal¶ firm profits in the US food processing industry by analyzing a sample of 125 
publicly quoted US food processors over the time span 1990-2008. Moreover, we aim to 
compare the US results to a matched sample of EU food processing firms. We advance the 
literature by first applying propensity score matching (PSM) in order to derive a sample of EU 
firms which is comparable to the US sample. This is necessary due to significant structural 
differences between the US and EU food processing industry -in particular regarding firm size. 
Subsequently, we apply the GMM dynamic panel estimator to the US and the matched EU 
panel to determine the extent of profit persistence as well as those factors that have an impact 
on the degree of µabnormal¶ firm profits. The US results are the first of this kind and we identify 
significant differences to the results of the matched EU panel. 
In the next section we present the theoretical background based on which the drivers of firm 
profitability are identified. Subsequently the econometrics used to match the US and EU panel 
and to estimate the persistence and drivers of µabnormal¶ firm profits are described. We then 
provide an overview of US and EU food processing and a description of the data. This is 
followed by the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, conclusions are drawn and 
implications derived. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Classical industrial organization theory and in particular the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm assumes that industry characteristics which determine the extent of entry 
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barriers and competition are the main determinant of firm performance. Among those 
characteristics are the degree of concentration as well as the size and growth rate of an industry 
(Bain 1956, 1968; Porter 1980). While the SCP has been heavily criticized for its assumption 
of a direct impact of industry structure on profitability (e.g. Tirole 1988) the Market-Based 
View (MBV), as a dynamic extension of the SCP, additionally considers the strategic 
positioning of firms within the industry (Welge and Al-Laham 2008). Consequently, besides 
industry structure strategic management literature stresses the importance of business-specific 
resources as determinants of profitability (Goddard et al. 2005). According to Penrose (1959) 
firms are to be interpreted as bundles of physical and intangible resources. Divergence of 
performance between firms, emerges due to differences in endowment with those resources. 
According to the resource based view (RBV), firms endowed with specific valuable, rare and 
inimitable resources are more competitive and hence outperform the market (Barney 1991; 
Peteraf 1993). Those  resources include tangible i.e. financial and physical factors of production 
as well as intangible factors such as technology and reputation (Claver et al. 2002; Goddard et 
al. 2005). When estimating the impact of firm specific resources in particular firm size, market 
share, growth, age, advertising, R&D, patents and financial risk have been identified as 
empirical proxies by previous literature (e.g. Yurtoglu 2004; Chaddad and Mondelli, 2013). 
IQ WKH ¶V a supplementary strand of research known as WKH µ1HZ (PSLULFDO
,QGXVWULDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶OLWHUDWXUH1(,2KDVHPHUJHGHJ%UHVQDKDQNEIO studies 
model the strategic and competitive behavior of firms on the basis of game theory and structural 
econometric approaches. Those models enable to consider more detailed industry- and firm-
specific factors than what modeling based on the MBV and the RBV can capture. Among those 
factors are demand structures, cost advantages and collusive behavior that decreases 
competition. However, while NEIO provides a useful background for case studies, as it allows 
for a detailed modeling of specific sub-industries (e.g. dairy processing or meat processing), we 
aim to provide generalizable insights of profitability across industries of the food sector based 
on the structural relationships suggested by the MBV and the RBV. (Kadiyali et al., 2001) 
 
3. Methodology 
We first employ PSM, a method commonly applied in observational studies to eliminate 
selection biases, to construct an EU sample that matches the 125 publicly quoted US firms 
(Huang et al. 2013). Afterwards, we quantify the persistence of µabnormal¶ firm profits as well 
as the factors that have an influence on the degree of µabnormal¶ firm profits for both samples.  
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3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
PSM is commonly applied in observational studies to eliminate selection biases that arise if 
observations are not randomly assigned to receive a specific treatment (Heinrich et al. 2010). 
The main objective of PSM is to match an untreated group to a group that receives a specific 
treatment such that the observations of the untreated group can be compared to those of the 
treated group regarding all attributes except for the treatment (Huang et al. 2013).  
PSM has been employed in diverse fields of study such as the evaluation of labor market 
policies (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 1999), or medical and pharmacoepidemiological research 
(e.g. Perkins et al. 2000; Austin 2008) (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Regarding the 
agribusiness sector Cavatassi et al. (2011) examine the effect of an agricultural program to 
increase potato production in Ecuador. They show that participants in the program generate 
enhanced yields compared to a matched sample of non-participants. Bontemps et al. (2013) 
derive matched samples of French cheese industry firms and estimate the impact of adopting 
quality labels on firm survival. The results indicate that quality label effects reduce the risk of 
non-survival for smaller firms. In order to estimate the effect of a ban on antibiotics on U.S. 
hog farmers Key and McBride (2014) use PSM to derive matched samples of antibiotic users 
and non-users. They find that the output of users is 1.0 to 1.3% higher compared to the matched 
sample of non-users.   
In general, PSM can be applied to settings where a treatment (e.g. medication, labor market 
policy, agricultural policy intervention) is given to a specific group of individuals. The majority 
of research focuses on the outcome of the treatment, referred to as WKHµDYHUDJHWUHDWPHQWHIIHFW
on the treated (ATT)¶, by comparing the treated sample with a constructed matched sample of 
untreated observations. Algebraically the ATT can be defined as:  
> @ > @1|)0(1|)1(    DYEDYEATT ,        (1) 
where Y(D) is either the outcome of an observation that has been treated (if D = 1) or of an 
observation that has not been exposed to treatment (if D = 0). Thus, the first conditional 
expectation in (1) refers to the mean outcome of the treatment across observations in the treated 
group while the second one indicates the mean outcome of observations in the treated group 
assuming that they did not receive treatment. However as > @1|)0(  DYE  is not observable a 
suitable substitute has to be constructed. Simply using the mean outcome value across all 
untreated observations > @0|)0(  DYE  leads to biased results as observations are not randomly 
assigned to treated and untreated groups. Thus, those factors (X) which have an impact on the 
likelihood of receiving treatment also have an impact on the treatment outcome (Caliendo and 
Kopeining 2005; Briggeman et al. 2009). One possible approach to construct a suitable proxy 
6 
 
for > @1|)0(  DYE  is to use a balancing score )()|1( XPXDP    which indicates the 
probability that an observation receives treatment, given the covariates X (Heckman et al. 1997; 
Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). )(XP  is usually referred to as an observation¶V Propensity 
Score (PS) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Becker and Ichino 2002). 36¶VDUHFDOFXODWHGXVLQJD
probit regression where the binary dependent variable takes a value of 1 for observations in the 
treated group and a value of 0 for non-treated observations. As independent variables (X) those 
factors are included which have an impact on receiving the treatment and on the treatment-
outcome (Rubin and Thomas 1996; Heckman et al. 1997; Smith and Todd 2005). The estimated 
values of the dependent variable of this regression constitute the observations¶ 36¶V. Using the 
36¶VWhe ATT can be calculated as:  
> @ > @^ `)(,0|)0()(,1|)1())(( 1)|( XPDYEXPDYEEXPATT DXP     ,        (2) 
where 1|)(  DXPE  GHQRWHV WKH PHDQ RYHU WKH DUHD RI RYHUODSSLQJ 36¶V IRU the treated and 
untreated group (Briggeman et al. 2009). The RYHUODSSLQJDUHDRI36¶VLVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHDUHD
RIµFRPPRQVXSSRUW¶ (Becker and Ichino 2002; Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Thus, the ATT 
defined by (2) is the average difference in the treatment-outcome variable between the treated 
and the untreated group over the area of common support. While equation (2) is defined over 
the common support area some problems regarding the goodness of the matching can arise 
when solely relying on the common support criterion. First, intervals within the area of common 
support which are characterized by minor overlap between 36¶V RI ERWK JURXSV are not 
considered (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Second, observations ZLWK36¶Vmarginally outside 
the area of common support might still be adequate matches for observations of the opposing 
group slightly inside the area of common support (Smith and Todd 2005). In order to eliminate 
this µcommon support problem¶ several matching algorithms can be applied in addition to the 
precondition of common support. The method we apply is referred to as radius matching where 
only those untreated observations are include that lie within a specific radius (e.g. 0.05 or 0.1) 
RI WKH 36¶V RI REVHUYDWLRQs in the treated group (Becker and Ichino 2002; Caliendo and 
Kopeining 2005). Radius matching accounts for areas with only minor PS overlap within the 
common support interval and considers suitable observations marginally outside this interval 
(Smith and Todd 2005).  
Compared to this standard matching procedure our approach is slightly different. We do not 
attempt to match US and EU firms based on propensity scores that are calculated by means of 
all structural firm characteristics and afterwards calculate the ATT (i.e. differences in 
µabnormal¶ profits between US and matched EU firms) based on (2). In contrast we take the 
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treatment, which in the present case is either being an US or an EU firm, as exogenously given 
and solely match the firms based on the most important structural measure -firm size. 
Afterwards, for both the US and the matched EU panel we estimate the effect of several 
structural firm- and industry variables on the outcome variable, which in the present case is 
µabnormal¶ firm profit. For this purpose we apply dynamic panel models based on the GMM 
estimator. We also check for significant differences between regression coefficients of both 
models. The advantage of our approach is that it first provides comparable samples regarding 
the structural characteristic of interest -firm size- and afterwards allows to implement the GMM 
estimator which is the suitable econometric approach to capture the dynamics present in the 
data. The standard matching process described above, however, does not adequately consider 
the dynamic time series behavior of µabnormal¶ firm profits.  
3.2 Dynamic panel model (GMM estimator) 
Following the matching process we estimate the persistence as well as the drivers of µabnormal¶ 
profits for the US and the matched EU panel. Earlier studies analyzing the dynamics of firm 
profits over time (e.g. Mueller 1990; Gschwandtner 2005) employ a simple autoregressive 
process of order one (AR1) estimated with OLS1: 
tiitiiti vc ,1,,   KSOS  ,             (3) 
where iK  is an unobserved firm-specific effect and ti ,Q is an observation specific error term 
(Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009). In (3) ti ,S  is firm i¶Vµabnormal¶ profitability in period t. 
ti ,S  is defined as the difference between firm i¶V UHWXUQ RQ DVVHWV 52$ LQ t and the 
competitive norm which is proxied by average industry ROA in t (e.g. Hirsch and 
Gschwandtner 2013). The estimated autoregressive coefficient iOÖ  can then be used for each 
firm as a measure of profit persistence as it indicates the percentage of µabnormal¶ profits that 
sustains from period to period. Mean iOÖ  across firms in an industry can serve as an indicator 
for the competitive pressure within this sector as high competition decreases the likelihood that 
µabnormal¶ profits persist. Some studies (e.g. Gschwandtner 2012) implement a second 
estimation step by regressing structural firm and industry variables such as firm size or industry 
concentration on iOÖ  in order to explain the latter.  
                                                          
1
 Some studies DOVRLPSOHPHQWDµbest lag PRGHO¶ZKLFKLQFRUSRUDWHVODJVRIKLJKHURUGHU*VFKZDQGWQHU). 
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However, the classical approach has the drawback that applying OLS to (3) leads to 
inconsistent and upward biased estimates of iO  due to an endogeneity bias caused by 
0);( 1, z itiCov KS . Similarly, the fixed effects (within) estimator leads to biased estimates. This 
estimator performs OLS on the equation with each variable adjusted by its mean over time. 
However, fixed effects estimates are still inconsistent and biased as 0);( 1, z iti vCov S , where   
.iiti vvv   reflects the mean-adjusted error term (Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009). Thus, to 
obtain consistent and unbiased estimates we apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator to an extended version of (3):  
tiitij
j
jtiti Zc ,,,1,, )( QKDOSS  ¦             (4) 
The autoregressive coefficient (OÖ ) can then be used as a measure for the degree of profit 
persistence across the analyzed panel of firms. Additionally, a vector of j time-variant structural 
firm and industry specific variables (Z) is added to the model in order to estimate the impact of 
these variables on µabnormal¶ firm profits over time. The GMM estimator first-differentiates 
the equation eliminating the time invariant firm-specific effect ( iK ). Afterwards, based on the 
assumption of no serial correlation in the error term ( itv ) lags of the endogeneous independent 
variable ( 1, tiS ) can be used as valid instruments to estimate the first-differenced equation. 
Similar to Goddard et al. (2005) the independent variables included in Z are treated as 
exogenous implying that they can instrument themselves (Andres et al. 2009; Roodman 2009, 
Hirsch and Gschwandtner 2013). However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show based on Monte Carlo simulations that in cases where the autoregressive parameter 
(O ) is large the difference GMM estimator behaves poorly as lagged values of the endogeneous 
independent variable ( 1, tiS ) constitute weak instruments. They extend the difference GMM 
estimator by focusing on a system of first-differenced and levels equations. Lagged differences 
of the endogeneous independent variable ( 1, tiS ) are then used as instruments for the levels 
equation in addition to the lagged values of the independent variable which are used as 
instruments for the first-differenced equation. This estimator is usually referred to as system 
GMM (Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009).2  
                                                          
2
 Compared to the classical two-step AR(1) approach GMM has the disadvantage that we can only determine the 
impact of the independent variables (Z) on µabnormal¶ profits but not on the profit persistence measure OÖ . 
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Hirsch (2014) shows that average OÖ  across manufacturing sectors is 0.45. Furthermore, 
according to Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) OÖ ¶Vfor the EU food processing industry turn 
out to be even lower with values between 0.110 and 0.304 for the five EU countries analyzed 
in their study. Thus, as we can expect rather low OÖ ¶V, system GMM will likely not be superior 
to the difference estimator. We therefore focus on the robustness parameters of each estimator 
(e.g. Hansen/Sargan test for the correct implementation of the instruments and the test for 
second order autocorrelation) in order to decide which of the estimators to present. Furthermore, 
we also estimate equation (4) using OLS in order to quantify the bias of this estimator. 
 
4. US and EU food processing industry population and sample 
In this section we first discuss structural characteristics of the US and EU food processing 
industry. We then present the construction, representativeness and descriptive statistics of our 
samples.  
4.1 US and EU food processing industry 
The first two columns of table 1 compare the US and EU-28 food processing industry based on 
key indicators. The EU-28 food industry is in general larger than the US food processing 
industry having both a higher value of overall sales and a much larger number of firms. The 
number of firms in the EU exceeds the respective US value by a factor of almost 10. In 2011 
the US food processing industry contributes 14.7%, 14.2%, and 10.3%, to total manufacturing 
sales, employees and number of firms, respectively (USDoC 2014). The EU-28 food processing 
industry is characterized by a similarly high economic importance with shares of 14.8% of total 
manufacturing sales and 14.1% in manufacturing employees. However, the EU-28 food 
processing LQGXVWULHV¶VKDUHLQWKHWRWDOQXPEHURIPDQXIDFWXULQJILUPVLVZLWK 13.8% higher 
than in the US (Eurostat 2014). Combined with the much larger number of food processors in 
the EU-28 this points towards significantly different size class structures between both 
industries.  
This fact is also highlighted in the lower panel of table 1 which shows a significantly higher 
percentage of small firms in the EU-28 and a much higher percentage of larger firms in the US. 
While almost 80% of the firms in the EU-28 food sector have less than 10 employees3, in the 
US only around 50% of the firms are that small. At the same time the percentage of firms with 
                                                          
3
 Although, the majority of EU firms are micro sized with less than 10 employees those firms only account for 
8.6% of total EU-28 food processing industry turnover (Eurostat 2014). 
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more than 20 employees is more than three times as large in the US than in the EU-28. While 
the percentage of firms with more than 500 employees is 13.7 in the US, in the EU-28 less than 
1% of the firms has more than 250 employees.  
Insert table 1 here 
4.2 US and EU dataset 
The US sample was constructed using 6WDQGDUGDQG3RRU¶VCompustat, a commercial database 
on financial information of US publicly quoted firms, and the US economic census (USDoC 
2014). The EU sample is based on AMADEUS, a pan European balance sheet database 
including firms of all legal forms and size classes, and the Eurostat database (Eurostat 2014). 
While Compustat and AMADEUS provide firm-level data the US census and Eurostat serve 
for the construction of variables related to the subsectors of the food processing industry.  
In order to construct the US sample we first selected all 409 firms active in any of the 6-digit 
NAICS4  codes between 311111 and 312140, i.e. firms that operate in food and beverage 
manufacturing. The time span available is 1990-2012. However, as data for the EU is only 
available till 2008 we first restrict the US sample to 1990-2008 in order to ensure comparability. 
Subsequently we consider the effect that the 2008/2009 economic crises, which is not covered 
by the EU sample, has on firms in the US sample by estimating a second model that includes 
the post 2008 observations. We deleted all firms with less than 10 years of ROA data available 
as this is the minimum time series dimension necessary to adequately capture the persistence 
of profits (Wiggins and Ruefli 2002). We identify all observations outside an interval of +/- 3 
standard deviations around the mean as outliers leading to a final sample of 125 firms. On 
average 12.5 years of data are available for each firm. Besides ROA, data on firm size, firm 
growth, PDUNHW VKDUH DV ZHOO DV ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO ULVN LV DYDLODEOH to capture the impact of 
physical, human and organizational firm specific resources in accordance with the RBV. 
Finally, in line with the MBV concentration as well as size and growth of 6-digit food 
processing subsectors are added to the sample from the US census (USDoC 2014) to capture 
the impact of entry barriers and competition.    
The EU sample was constructed similarly by including all firms active in any 4-digit NACE 
industry between DA1511 and DA1598 (i.e. the manufacturing of food and beverages) with at 
least 10 ROA observations. The period covered is 1996 to 2008 as AMADEUS was initiated in 
1996 and data availability post 2008 is poor. 5  Due to data availability the EU sample is 
                                                          
4
 NAICS and NACE are the statistical classifications of economic activities in the US and the EU, respectively.  
5
 Although this time span is not totally equal to the time span covered by the US sample, reducing the US sample 
to 1996-2008 would significantly reduce the number of firms with at least 10 ROA observations and lead to an 
inadequate sample size. 
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restricted to the 5 countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. However, with 
contributions of 53.2%, 41.3% and 55.5% to total EU-28 food processing industry sales, 
employees and number of firms, respectively a significant share of the EU-28 food processing 
industry is covered by those 5 countries (cf. last column of table 1). Germany, the largest 
contributor to EU food processing industry turnover with 17.8 % (Eurostat 2014) could not be 
included due to a lack of data as non-publicly quoted firms had no legal obligations to publicize 
accounting data until the year 2007 (Hirsch and Schiefer 2016).    
All observations outside +/- 3 standard deviations around the mean were dropped and 
industry data related to concentration as well as size and growth of 4-digit food processing 
subsectors IURP (XURVWDW¶V VWUXFWXUDO EXVLQHVV VWDWLVWLFV (XURVWDW  was added. As 
AMADEUS comprises firms of all legal forms (limited partnerships, private, publicly quoted, 
and cooperatives) and size classes the resulting sample comprises 5,494 firms and is 
significantly larger than the US sample. On average 13 years of data are available for each firm. 
This EU sample has previously been analyzed regarding profit persistence by Hirsch and 
Gschwandtner (2013). In the present article we use this sample as a basis to construct a sample 
that matches the 125 publicly quoted US firms.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of firm and industry characteristics in the US and the 
EU samples. We first describe the variables for the US sample and the initial EU sample. The 
results for the matched EU sample in the third column will be discussed below subsequent to 
the matching procedure.  
ROA is calculated as the quotient of ILUPV¶SURILWORVVEHIRUHWD[DWLRQSOXV LQWHUHVW6, and 
total assets. There has been a vast debate regarding the suitability of accounting profit measures 
such as ROA as those measures can suffer from biases due to profit smoothing or cross 
subsidization (e.g. Fisher and McGowan 1983; Long and Ravenscraft 1984). Some studies 
therefore use alternatives such as economic value added (EVA) developed by Stern Steward 
and Co., which measures the economic returns generated for shareholders or Tobins q. 
However, Biddle et al. (1997) illustrate that EVA is outperformed by balance sheet earnings as 
a performance proxy as returns and firm values are more strongly correlated with earnings than 
with EVA. Therefore, to assure comparability to previous literature we use ROA as the proxy 
for firm profitability. Moreover, correlation coefficients between ROA and the value added 
measure provided by AMADEUS exceed 0.8 and are significant at p<0.01 for each year and 
country7. According to table 2 ROA is on average significantly lower in the US sample than in 
                                                          
6
 To make ROA independent of the source of funds used, interest has to be included in the numerator. 
7
 This only holds for the 5 EU countries as VA is not available for the US. 
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the EU sample pointing towards higher competition in the US, maybe due to the lower 
concentration in the retail sector and less potential subsidies than in the EU.  
Confirming the results for the population in table 1, the average firm size, measured by firms¶ 
total assets, is with $2.5 bn. significantly higher in the US sample than in the EU sample where 
the respective value is is only $19.2 m. As can be seen from the size class distribution at the 
bottom of the table, similar to the population, we have mainly large firms in the US sample 
(72.8%) and mainly small and micro firms in the EU sample (85.8%). Nevertheless, the firm 
growth factor, calculated as the yearly growth rate of total assets, is similar in both samples 
with a value around 1.1. 
Market share was calculated for each firm as the ratio of its sales to the overall sales in the 
NAICS/NACE sector in which the firm operates. Surprisingly, average market share of firms 
in the US sample is with 2.3% significantly lower than in the EU sample where the average 
firm has a market share of 7.5%. However, as will become apparent below in comparison to the 
EU sample the US sample is characterized by a larger share of firms that operate in subsectors 
that generate higher outputs and vice versa. Despite the much larger average firm size this leads 
to a lower average market share in the US sample. 
Firms in the US sample engage on average significantly less in short-term and long-term 
financial risk than firms in the EU. Average short-term risk, measured by the reciprocal of a 
ILUP¶VFXUUHQW UDWLR, i.e. the quotient of current liabilities to current assets, is approximately 
twice as large in the EU. Long-term risk is measured by the firms gearing ratio, i.e. the quotient 
of non-current liabilities to shareholder funds. The average gearing ratio is about 2/3 in the US 
than it is in the EU sample.  
We now turn our attention to industry related variables. For the EU sample concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated as the sum of the 
squared market shares of the 50 largest firms in each 4-digit NACE subsector. Due to data 
availability concentration for each 6-digit NAICS sector in the US sample has to be measured 
by the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) which corresponds to the market share of the four 
largest firms in each NAICS sector. While the HHI and the CR4 cannot be directly compared 
quantitatively, both measures indicate that the majority of firms in the samples operate in 
industries that are characterized by moderate concentration. While the mean CR4 of 0.489 in 
the US sample is just below the threshold for oligopolistic industry structures (CR4 > 0.5), the 
average HHI for the EU sample of 0.039 indicates that the majority of firms are active in 
industries with low concentration (Threshold for oligopolistic structure: HHI > 0.1).     
13 
 
Industry size and growth are measured by the sales of each 6-digit NAICS and 4-digit NACE 
food processing subsector, respectively. Despite the lower number of total food processing sales 
in the population average industry size is significantly larger in the US sample ($22.4 billion 
vs. $3.9 billion). This is due to the fact that in the EU sample a larger fraction of firms is active 
in subsectors that generate lower outputs (e.g. 1$&( '$ µ0DQXIDFWXUH RI ZLQHV¶ RU
'$µ0DQXIDFWXUHRIJUDLQPLOOSURGXFWV¶). Nevertheless, firms in the EU sample operate 
in industries that grow stronger as the average industry growth factor of 1.4 is significantly 
larger than in the US sample where growth stagnates.  
Insert table 2 here 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Propensity score matching results 
Propensity scores are estimated using a probit model where the binary dependent variable takes 
a value of 1 for observations in the US sample and a value of 0 for observations in the EU 
sample. As independent variable we use firm size as the structural characteristic of interest. In 
order to avoid sample selection bias, for the matching process we use firm sales as an instrument 
for our prime firm size measure, total assets. This is necessary as we aim to afterwards include 
total assets as an independent variable to explain µabnormal¶ profits. The probit-regression 
results indicate that firm size measured by sales has a significantly positive impact on the 
probability that a firm is in the US sample. 
The third column of table 2 shows the firm size distributions after the matching process. 
From the initial EU sample which comprises 5,494 firms 1,911 are identified, based on the area 
RIFRPPRQVXSSRUWRI36¶VDQGWKHUDGLXVPDWFKLQJDOJRULWKP to match the 125 US firms.8 
The fraction of micro firms is significantly reduced in the EU sample from 61.1% to 9.3%. 
However, the fraction of large firms remains significantly smaller in the EU sample than in the 
US sample.  
The balancing property serves as a goodness measure for the matching process. In the present 
case it is fulfilled at p<0.01 which indicates that the size of firms in the US and the matched EU 
sample is similar even within PS subsets (i.e. quantiles) over the common support area 
(Cavatassi et al. 2011). Additionally, the reduction in the standardized bias9 can be used as a 
measure for the success of the matching. Previous studies interpret a reduction of this bias by 
                                                          
8
 Several estimation attempts with different radii (0.15, 0.1 and 0.05) led to identical results. 
9
 The standardized bias is calculated as: ))()((*5.0)( 0101 xVxVxxSB  , where )(, 11 xVx and 
)(, 00 xVx are mean and variance of firm size in the US and the (matched) EU sample, respectively. 
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around 3% as sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Nevertheless, the matching process 
only leads to a reduction of the bias by 1.1% indicating that significant differences in size 
classes remain after the matching process. Those also become evident from table 2 which 
indicates that although average firm size in the EU sample increases from $19.2 to $52.6 m. in 
total assets this value remains significantly smaller than the US value of $2.9 bn. Nevertheless, 
our intention to use PSM is to identify EU firms that are embedded in a similar competitive 
situation as the US firms. This implies however, that firms in both samples are not necessarily 
equal in terms of size. Nonetheless, the matched EU sample likely represents a similar part of 
the size class distribution of the EU food processing industry as the one represented by the 125 
US firms. We suppose that this approach is more meaningful than simply focusing on EU firms 
that have exactly the same size as the US firms as firms would be less comparable regarding 
their competitive situation.10 
5.2 Explaining µabnormal¶ profits 
The results of the GMM dynamic panel estimation are presented in table 3 in the first two 
columns. The OLS results in columns 4 and 5 are presented just as robustness checks. If the 
results of GMM shall be correct then the autoregressive coefficient shall be below the OLS 
results and we can observe that this is the case. We also calculated the significances of the 
differences between the US and EU-5 GMM coefficients.  
We can observe that the short-run persistence parameter (OÖ ) is positive and significant in 
both samples, meaning that past year`s profits have a significant impact on this year`s profits 
and therefore profit persistence exists. However, there is no significant difference between the 
US and EU persistence coefficient which confirms that the matching process has generated US 
and EU firms that operate in comparable competitive situations in their respective industries. 
The OÖ  values of 0.292 for the US and 0.236 for the EU food processing industry are lower 
compared to other manufacturing sectors. For the entire US manufacturing sector 
Gschwandtner (2012) using GMM with a similar set of explanatory variables finds OÖ  values 
between 0.549 and 0.722. Goddard et al. (2005) find OÖ  values between 0.323 and 0.452 for 
entire manufacturing sectors of the same five EU countries.  
                                                          
10
 An alternative matching strategy would have been to first ensure homogeneity across EU firms by performing 
PSM for all 10 possible combinations between the 5 EU countries. However, this was neglected as similar to 
Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) we want to consider the EU food processing industry in its entirety as a single 
market of goods and services. 
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We now focus on firm-specific characteristics that in accordance with the RBV should affect 
profitability. Regarding firm size the results are significantly different between the EU and US. 
Even though the impact on µabnormal¶ profitability is positive and significant in both samples 
it is significantly higher in the EU. This is likely the case because in the EU the number of small 
firms is much higher and size is more crucial in outperforming the market. Moreover, as argued 
by Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) firm size plays an important role in the EU food processing 
industry and this also seems to be the case in the US. Probably, larger size allows to better deal 
with pre-market approvals, advertising costs, to establish reputation and to counteract the 
market power of retailers. 
Another variable where the EU and the US differ significantly is firm growth. While the 
impact on µabnormal¶ profitability is positive and significant in the US, its impact in the EU is 
insignificant. Obviously it is more difficult for firms in the EU food sector to successfully grow 
than it is in the US which may also be the reason why most of the firms in the EU are smaller 
than in the US. It may also be that in the EU the positive effect of growth is counteracted by its 
potentially negative effects e.g. in form of costs associated with growth.  
Market share is insignificant both in the EU and in the US. Usually a higher market share is 
expected to have a positive impact on µabnormal¶ profits. However, firms with high market 
share may also have transparency problems and diseconomies of scope that may counteract the 
positive effect leading to an insignificant effect in the end. Moreover, Prescott et al. (1986) 
show that the impact of market share is influenced by the external environment in which firms 
operate and can therefore also be negative. 
Short-term financial risk negatively impacts in both samples and the coefficients are not 
significantly different. However, the impact is only significant in the US sample. A negative 
impact has also been found by Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) for the EU. Short-term risk 
may put high pressure on the financial stress of firms and is expected to have a negative impact. 
Long-term financial risk (gearing) however, may help the firm to invest in R&D and recover 
from eventual financial distress. Thus, it may enable firms to make investments that help the 
company to grow and to reach a specific established market position or a critical firm size that 
ensures its competitiveness. Furthermore, Chaddad and Mondelli (2013) mention that financial 
pressure of debt reduces free cash flow, and may lead managers to invest more wisely and not 
to waste firm resources in perquisites and unprofitable growth. Therefore, a positive impact of 
long-term debt is expected. However, similar to our EU results the impact they found in their 
study is negative. Goddard et al. (2005) who also find a negative impact of gearing for EU 
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manufacturing firms FRQFOXGH WKDW µhighly leveraged firms may suffer in increasingly 
competitive markets, as they need to use a higher proportion of gross profits to service debt¶.  
The focus shall now be on those structural industry factors which according to the MBV 
determine the degree of entry barriers and competition. The results show that the impact of 
industry concentration is insignificant in both samples. Since in the US sample we measure 
concentration by the CR4 and in the EU sample by the HHI the difference between the 
coefficients of both samples could not be estimated. It is usually assumed that high 
concentration prevents entry, leading to less competition and higher µabnormal¶ profits. 
Nevertheless, strong concentration can also lead to intense rivalry between the dominant firms 
resulting in a negative impact. Moreover, it can also be the case that both effects neutralize each 
other leading to the insignificant impact of concentration in both the US and EU.  
Industry size does not impact significantly on µabnormal¶ profits and there is no significant 
difference between the two samples. However, there is a significant difference between the US 
and EU in the impact of industry growth on µabnormal¶ profitability. While the impact is 
positive and significant in the EU, it is significantly negative in the US. This indicates that US 
firms engage in stronger non-profit competition such as advertising when the industry grows 
which in turn reduces µabnormal¶ profitability. In contrast firms in growing EU industries 
behave more cooperatively which increases their profitability on average. The negative impact 
of industry growth in the US is not necessarily a contradiction WRWKHSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRIILUP¶V
growth. The growth of an individual firm may confer it a stronger position towards its rival. If 
the whole industry grows however, more fierce competition may develop between the firms 
that can have a negative impact on µabnormal¶ profitability. 
As the OÖ ¶V are rather small the system GMM estimator is not necessarily superior. 
However, for both samples we estimated system as well as difference GMM and decided to 
keep the model for which the goodness of fit parameters point towards higher robustness. For 
the US sample system GMM and for the matched EU panel difference GMM has been chosen 
as the best estimator according to the model diagnosis. For the final models the Wald statistic 
indicates their overall significance at the 1% level. Lags of second order or higher have been 
used as instruments for the endogeneous independent variable in both models and the Hansen 
test does not reject the null hypothesis that this is the correct implementation of instruments. 
Finally, for none of the models the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation is rejected 
indicating the consistency of the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). 
Insert table 3 here 
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In order to capture the effect that the inclusion of US observations that fall into the time span 
of the economic crisis and its aftermaths (2009-2013) has on the results we also estimate the 
US model including additional firm observations from the period 2009-2013. The results can 
be found in the third column of table 3. The effect of the crisis is reflected by a decrease in the 
short-run persistence measure ( OÖ ) to 0.260.11  The impact of the remaining explanatory 
variables remains constant with the exception of long-term debt. The respective coefficient 
remains positive but becomes significant. This implies that during macroeconomic crises debt 
can enable firms to make investments that lead to growth and a specific critical firm size and 
market position that ensures competitiveness. Furthermore, the difference in the coefficients for 
long-term debt between the US and the EU becomes significant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The food processing industries in the US and in the EU differ strongly with respect to the size 
of firms. In the US the average food processor is significantly larger than in the EU and PSM 
has been used to derive samples of comparable firm size. The present article analyzes the drivers 
of profit persistence in the US food processing sector and compares the results with those of 
the matched EU sample. To our knowledge, such an analysis -in particular for the US- has not 
been carried out before. 
The main drivers of µabnormal¶ profitability in the US food processing sector turn out to be 
firmV¶ size, growth and financial risk. Larger firms achieve a higher level of µabnormal¶ profits, 
a result that has also been previously obtained for the EU (Hirsch and Gschwandtner 2013). 
Thus, large firms may be able to perform more advertising, have higher consumer reputation 
and are better able to cope with competition pressures. The influence RI ILUPV¶ growth is 
significantly different between the US and the EU. While it is positive in the US it is 
insignificant in the EU. This may be the case because while growing firms have to take into 
consideration higher costs that may decrease profitability. By having easier access to debt, US 
firms are presumably able to better counteract this potentially negative effect of growth. And 
this points toward the next significant difference between the US and the EU. While long-term 
risk impacts negatively on µabnormal¶ profit in the EU it impacts positively on firms in the US 
when observations that fall into the period of the economic crisis and its aftermaths are included. 
As discussed before, long-term debt can enable firms to make the necessary investments that 
                                                          
11
 However, this decrease is not statistically significant. 
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help to ensure competitiveness in times of crisis. In the EU firms indebted in the long run find 
it more difficult to cope with risk. Finally, firms in the US and the EU differ with respect to the 
impact of industry growth on µabnormal¶ profit. The fact that firm and industry growth have a 
different impact is not necessarily a contradiction. While growing firms in the EU may face 
difficulties that lower their profitability, the fact that the industry as a whole grows may impact 
positively on the perception of FRQVXPHUVDQGPD\LQFUHDVHILUPV¶ profit. Growing firms in the 
US may find it easier to cope with competition, while the fact that the industry as a whole grows 
may make this competition process more ferocious which in turn impacts negatively on firms¶
µabnormal¶ profit.  
Some shortcomings of this article are the omission of important intangible firm-specific 
resources such as R&D activity, patents, reputation, and ownership structure due to data 
unavailability. Second, the fact that we only consider firms that report ROA observations over 
a ten year period raises the question whether results are affected by an upward survivorship 
bias. For example, Gschwandtner (2005) shows that surviving firms have in general higher 
profit persistence than firms that exit the market due to bankruptcy. However, AMADEUS only 
reports 1.4% of exiting firms as bankrupt while the majority of firms exiting the database during 
the analyzed time span are either acquired or part of merger activity. Although for the US 
sample similar information is not available the majority of firms with less than 10 ROA 
observations shows missing values in the middle of the analyzed time frame implying that data 
incompleteness in those cases is not a sign for firm exit but rather of flaws in the database. The 
extent of survivorship bias in both samples should therefore not be significant. Third, compared 
to NEIO approaches which allow a detailed modeling of specific sub-industries the present 
analysis can only provide overarching insights on the structural drivers of profitability across 
industries of the food sector.  
The results have not only purely descriptive value but can also be useful when designing 
policies aimed at supporting food sector firms or the food sector as a whole. This is important 
as today firms are facing economic circumstances characterized by reduced entry barriers and 
possibilities to operate in previously hardly accessible foreign markets. Those developments 
are a consequence of intensified globalization represented by trade agreements such as the 
NAFTA or the formation of a single market for goods and services within the EU. However, 
these deregulations of borders and international trade have led to a significant intensification of 
competition among firms across many sectors. The comparably low short-run persistence 
values (OÖ ) which have been estimated for the US and EU food industry also reflected this 
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development. Thus, competition seems to be working and a necessity for anti-trust measures at 
the processing-industry level cannot be evidenced.  
Nevertheless, pressure on the margins and competitiveness of food processors is further 
intensified by increasing uncertainty in raw material markets and strong concentration in retail 
sectors. (Schiefer 2011). While five-firm concentration ratios already exceed 70% in many EU 
member countries concentration is slightly weaker in the US retail sector, but shows an 
increasing trend (Wijnands et al. 2007; Wood 2013). A high and constantly growing share of 
private labels further increases power imbalances between processors and retailers (European 
Commission 2011). In the EU the food sector has already drawn attention of competition 
authorities with a focus of UHWDLOHU¶VEX\HUSRZHUYLV-à-vis the producers (European Competition 
Network, 2012). The present results confirm the need for policy interventions at the 
downstream level. Moreover, the positive impact of firm size and growth on profitability 
indicates that small firms and firms with low growth are in a disadvantageous position. Thus, 
policy measures which address the industry could focus on a decrease of administrative burdens 
particularly for the large number of small enterprises. Furthermore, policy actions that decrease 
unfavorable financial risk factors -particularly short term risk in the US and long term risk in 
the EU- might strengthen processors and help to counter power imbalances. Finally, the US 
results indicate that in times of economic crisis measures that facilitate access to long term debt 
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 US  EU-28 EU (Be, Fr, It, Sp, UK) 
Sales (bn. $)a 808.233 1,344.441 715.656 
No. of firms 30,384 289,199 160,504 
Employees (m.) 1.559 4.284 1.770 
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Data sources: Eurostat (2014) and USDoC (2014) 
Notes: food processing industry in the EU-28 defined as NACE Rev. 1.1 division 15 i.e. µManufacture of food 
products and beverages¶86IRRG processing LQGXVWU\GHILQHGE\1$,&6FRGHVµ)RRGPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶and  
µ%HYHUDJHPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶ 
a Value of shipments for the US  
b Data based on identical size classes for the EU and US food processing industries is not available for firms  
























Table 2. Descriptive statistics of firm and industry characteristics  
 
US  EU-5 
(no. of firms = 125; 
n=1,565) 
Initial sample  
(no. of firms=5,494; 
n=71,422) 
Matched sample  
(no of firms=1,911; 
n=24,843) 
Variable        Mean        Stdv.      Mean         Stdv.        Mean         Stdv. 
Firm characteristics  
ROA 0.032 0.138 0.059 0.065 0.053 0.053 
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Firm size (m. $) 2,483.136 5,453.379  19.167 162.633 52.590 272.584 
Firm growth  1.122 0.414 1.188 15.430 1.284 17.384 
Market share (%) 2.332 5.990 7.530 14.869 16.138 21.466 
Short-term risk 0.667 0.448 1.269 2.729 0.879 0.805 
Gearing 1.260 8.580 1.787 4.766 1.674 4.521 
Industry characteristics  
CR4/HHI 0.4890 0.187 0.039 0.079 0.047 0.080 
Industry size (bn. $) 22.428 20.341 3.878  5.732 4.155  5.368 
Industry growth 1.020 0.187 1.402 6.121 1.411 5.931 




















Firm variables: ROA = operating profit/total assets; Firm size = total assets; Firm growth = yearly growth rate of total assets; 
MS = firm sales/subsector sales; Short-term risk = current liabilities/current assets; Gearing = non-current 
liabilities/shareholder funds   
Industry variables: CR4 = four firm concentration ratio of NAICS industry in %; HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each 
NACE sector in the EU sample; Industry size = value of sales of NAICS/NACE industry; Industry growth = Growth rate of 
value of sales. 
Source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS, Eurostat (2014), Compustat and USDoC (2014). 
a To assure comparability for both the EU and the US firms are assigned to size classes based on the SME definition of the 
European Commission (2005): Micro: total assets <$ 2.63 million; Small: total assets <$ 13.14 million; Medium: total assets 
<$ 56.51 million. Firms are assigned to these size classes based on their total assets in the first available year   












US EU-5 (matched) 
US        





0.236      
(3.08)*** 












0.025      
(5.88)*** 
0.012      
(3.02)*** 
0.009    
(4.68)*** 
-0.000          
(-0.10) 
Firm growth  0.738  
(2.51)** 
-0.000          
(-1.57) 
0.759      
(2.79)*** 
0.653   
(4.10)*** 
0.000           
(1.35) 
Market share -0.000         
(-0.00) 
0.000           
(1.02) 
-0.000          
(-0.06) 
0.000         
(0.49) 
-0.000          
(-0.49) 
Short-term risk -0.042         
(-2.68)*** 
-0.035          
(-0.99) 
-0.043          
(-3.27)*** 
-0.037         
(-5.39)*** 
-0.003          
(-5.85)*** 
Gearing  0.001      
(1.51) 
-0.000          
(-3.34)*** 
0.001       
(2.81)*** 
0.001    
(2.18)** 




0.000    
(0.29) 
0.003           
(0.18) 
-0.000          
(-0.12) 
0.000         
(0.32) 
0.018      
(4.89)*** 
Industry size  -0.000         
(-0.26) 
-0.000          
(-1.09) 
-0.000          
(0.29) 
-0.000         
(-0.22) 
0.000           
(1.25) 
Industry growth  -0.017         
(-1.77)* 
0.000         
(2.14)** 
-0.015          
(-1.63)* 
-0.023        
(-1.87)* 




-0.875         
(-2.69)*** 
- -0.891          
(-2.97)*** 
-0.743         
(-4.56)*** 


































22.44     
p=0.434 
 



























(abnormal profit)   
Firm variables: Firm size = natural logarithm of total assets; Firm growth = yearly growth rate of total assets;    
MS = firm sales/industry value of sales; Short term risk = current liabilities/current assets; Gearing = non-
current liabilities/shareholder funds. 
Industry variables: CR4 = four firm concentration ratio of NAICS industry; HHI=Herfindahl Index of NACE 
industry; Industry size = sales of NAICS/NACE industry; Industry growth = growth rate of value of sales. 
Numbers in parentheses are z-/t-values based on robust standard errors.  
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